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Abstract The paper presents an idea and experimental re-
sults for RSTEG (Retransmission Steganography), which is
an intra-protocol hybrid network steganography method. It
is intended for a broad class of protocols that utilises retrans-
mission mechanisms. RSTEG enables hidden communica-
tion by not acknowledging a successfully received packet in
order to intentionally invoke retransmission. The retransmit-
ted packet carries a steganogram instead of user data in the
payload field. Experimental results for TCP-based RSTEG
traffic analysis are enclosed which were focused on mea-
suring steganographic bandwidth and influence on TCP net-
work traffic in terms of undetectability.
Keywords RSTEG · Network steganography ·
Retransmission mechanism
1 Introduction
Network steganography is a new trend in steganography
which utilizes hiding secret data in the normal data transmis-
sions of users so that it ideally cannot be detected by third
parties. Network steganography methods may be viewed as
a threat to network security, as they may be used, among
others, as a tool data exfiltration. For this reason, it is impor-
tant to identify possibilities for covert communication, as
knowledge of information hiding procedures may be used to
develop countermeasures.
Network steganography methods may be classified as
intra- or inter-protocol steganography [1]. If hidden com-
munication is performed using single network protocol as
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a secret data (steganogram) carrier then it is called intra-
protocol steganography. If two or more protocols are utilized
it is called inter-protocol steganography (the example of the
inter-protocol steganographic is PadSteg [1]). Intra-protocol
methods may be classified into following subgroups:
− Steganographic methods that modify protocol PDUs,
including network protocol headers, payload fields or
both. Example methods: HICCUPS (Hidden Communi-
cation System for Corrupted Networks [2]), watermark-
ing algorithms, speech codec steganographic algorithms,
methods based on the modification of IP, TCP and UDP
header fields.
− Steganographic methods that modify PDUs time re-
lations, for example, by affecting the order of packets,
modifying inter-packet delay or introducing intentional
losses [3]. These methods are harder to detect, but gives
lower steganographic capacity than methods that utilise
protocol-specific fields. Using methods from this group
may affect transmission quality.
− Hybrid steganographic methods that modify both
the content of packets and their timing and ordering.
Methods from this group are hard to detect and gives
high steganographic bandwidth, but may affect trans-
mission quality. Example of hybrid method is RSTEG
(Retransmission Steganography), which was originally
introduced in [4] and is presented in detail in this paper.
In the context of the above classification of network
steganography methods, we proposed in [4] a new hybrid
method called RSTEG, which is intended for a broad class
of protocols that utilise retransmission mechanisms. The
main innovation of RSTEG is to not acknowledge a suc-
cessfully and orderly received packet to intentionally invoke
retransmission. The retransmitted packet of user data then
carries a steganogram in the payload field.
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Fig. 1 Generic retransmission
mechanism based on timeouts
(1, 2); RSTEG (3)
This paper is an extension and summarization of previous
work on RSTEG which was presented in [4] and [5] and fo-
cuses on RSTEG real network traffic analysis and detection.
2 General idea of RSTEG
RSTEG can be used for all protocols that utilise retransmis-
sions at different layers of OSI RM. A generic retransmis-
sion mechanism based on timeouts is presented in Fig. 1.
RSTEG may be applied also to other retransmission mecha-
nisms in TCP, such as FR/R (Fast Retransmit and Recovery)
or SACK (Selective Acknowledgement).
In a simplified case, a typical protocol that uses a retrans-
mission mechanism based on timeouts obligates a receiver
to acknowledge each received packet (Fig. 1, case 1). When
the packet is not successfully received, no acknowledgment
is sent after the timeout expires, and so the packet is retrans-
mitted (Fig. 1, case 2).
As mentioned in Sect. 1, RSTEG uses a retransmis-
sion mechanism to reliably exchange steganograms. Both a
sender and a receiver are aware of the steganographic pro-
cedure. At some point during the connection after success-
fully receiving a packet, the receiver intentionally does not
issue an acknowledgment message. In a normal situation, a
sender is obligated to retransmit the lost packet when the
timeframe within which packet acknowledgement should
have been received expires. In the context of RSTEG, a
sender replaces original payload with a steganogram instead
of sending the same packet again. When the retransmitted
packet reaches the receiver, it can extract hidden informa-
tion (Fig. 1, case 3).
Note that the steganogram sender and receiver may not
be simultaneously the sender and receiver of the overt com-
munication; in some scenarios they can be both located at
network intermediate nodes. In this case it is harder to un-
cover the steganographic communication as the typical lo-
cation of the node used for steganalysis is near the sender or
receiver of the overt transmission.
The performance of RSTEG depends on many factors,
such as the details of the communication procedure (in par-
ticular the size of the packet payload, the rate at which
segments are generated and so on). No real-world stegano-
graphic method is perfect; whatever the method, the hidden
information can be potentially discovered. In general, the
more hidden information is inserted into the data stream, the
greater the chance that it will be detected, for example, by
scanning the data flow or by some other steganalysis meth-
ods. Detection possibilities details are presented in Sect. 3.5.
3 TCP-based RSTEG: functioning, detection
and traffic analysis
Applying RSTEG to TCP is the natural choice for IP net-
works, as a vast amount of Internet traffic (about 80–90%)
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is based on this protocol. For TCP, the following retransmis-
sion mechanisms are defined:
• RTO (Retransmission Timeouts) in which segment loss
detection is based on RTO timer expiration. Results from
[6] show that 60–88% of all retransmissions on the Inter-
net were caused by RTO mechanism. In RTO, a segment
is considered lost if the receiver does not receive an ac-
knowledgement segment (ACK) after the specified period
of time, after which it is retransmitted. The RTO timer
value varies in TCP implementation across different op-
erating systems, and it depends mainly on RTT (Round
Trip Time) and its variation. If the RTO timer is set to too
low of a value, it may cause too many spurious retrans-
missions; otherwise, the sender will be waiting too long
to retransmit a lost segment, which may cause throughput
decrease.
• FR/R (Fast Retransmit/Recovery) is based on detecting
duplicate ACKs (that is, ACKs with the same acknowl-
edgement number). A receiver acknowledges all seg-
ments delivered in order. When segments arrive out of
order, the receiver must not increase the acknowledge-
ment number so as to avoid data gaps but instead sends
ACKs with unchanged acknowledgement number values,
which are called duplicate ACKs (dupACKs). Usually, a
segment is considered lost after the receipt of three dupli-
cate ACKs. Issuing duplicate ACKs by the receiver is of-
ten a result of out-of-order segment delivery. If the num-
ber of duplicate ACKs that triggers retransmission is too
small, it can cause too many retransmissions and can de-
grade network performance.
• SACK (Selective Acknowledgement) is based on Fast
Retransmit/Recovery. It uses an extended ACK option
that contains blocks edges to deduce which received
blocks of data are non-contiguous. When retransmission
is triggered, only missing segments are retransmitted.
This feature of SACK decreases network load.
3.1 RSTEG insertion and extracting procedures for TCP
The intentional retransmissions caused by RSTEG should
be kept at a reasonable level to avoid detection. To achieve
this goal, it is necessary to determine the average number of
natural retransmissions in TCP-based Internet traffic as well
as to know how intentional retransmissions affect the net-
work retransmission rate. Usually network retransmissions
are caused by network overload, excessive delays or reorder-
ing of packets [6], and their number is estimated to account
for up to 7% of all Internet traffic [6, 7].
RSTEG can be applied to all retransmission mechanisms
presented above. It requires modification to both a sender
and a receiver. A sender should control the insertion pro-
cedure and decide when a receiver should invoke a retrans-
mission. The sender is also responsible to keep the number
of retransmissions at a non-suspicious level. The receiver’s
role is to detect when the sender indicates that intentional
retransmission should be triggered. Then, when the retrans-
mitted segment arrives, the receiver should be able to extract
the steganogram.
The sender must be able to mark segments selected for
hidden communication (that is, retransmission request seg-
ments) so the receiver would know which segments retrans-
missions should be invoked and which segments will contain
steganograms. However, marked TCP segment should not
differ from those sent during a connection. The following
procedure for marking sender segments is proposed. Let us
assume that the sender and receiver share a secret Steg-Key
(SK). For each fragment chosen for steganographic commu-
nication, the following hash function (H) is used to calculate
the Identifying Sequence (IS):
IS = H(SK‖Sequence Number‖TCP Checksum‖CB) (3.1)
Note that as H it could be used any secure hash function. Se-
quence Number and TCP Checksum denote values from the
chosen TCP header fields in segments, ‖ is the bits concate-
nation function, and CB is a control bit that allows the re-
ceiver to distinguish a retransmission request segment from
a segment with a steganogram. For every TCP segment used
for hidden communications, the resulting IS will have differ-
ent value due to the variety of values in the Sequence Num-
ber and TCP Checksum header fields. All IS bits (or only
selected ones) are distributed by the sender across a seg-
ment’s payload field in a predefined manner. The receiver
must analyse each incoming segment; based on SK and val-
ues from the TCP header, the receiver calculates two values
of IS, namely, one with CB = 1 and one with CB = 0. Then
the receiver checks if and which IS is present inside the re-
ceived segment.
Problems may arise when the segment that informs the
receiver of a necessity to invoke an intentional retransmis-
sion (which contains user data together with the IS) is lost
due to network conditions. In that case, a normal retransmis-
sion is triggered, and the receiver is not aware that the seg-
ment with hidden data will be sent. However, in this case,
the sender believes that retransmission was invoked inten-
tionally by the receiver, and so he/she issues the segment
with steganogram and the IS. In this scenario, user data will
be lost, and the cover connection may be disturbed.
In order to address the situation in which the receiver
reads a segment with an unexpected steganogram, the re-
ceiver should not acknowledge reception of this segment
until he/she receives the segment with user data. When the
ACK is not sent to the sender, another retransmission is in-
voked. The sender is aware of the data delivery failure, but
he/she does not know which segment to retransmit, so he/she
first issues a segment with user data. If delivery confirmation
is still missing, then the segment with steganogram is sent.
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Fig. 2 RTO-based RSTEG
segment recovery example
The situation continues until the sender receives the correct
ACK. This mechanism of correcting steganogram network
losses is illustrated in Fig. 2.
For example, consider the scenario in which 0.5% inten-
tional retransmissions are invoked. If 5% of them are lost, it
means that the above-described mechanism will take place
only for 0.025% of steganogram segments, thus it will occur
rarely.
RSTEG may be applied to the retransmission mecha-
nisms presented previously as follows:
• RTO-based RSTEG: The sender marks a segment se-
lected for hidden communication by distributing the IS
across its payload. After successful segment delivery, the
receiver does not issue an ACK message. When the RTO
timer expires, the sender sends a steganogram inside the
retransmitted segment’s payload (see Fig. 1). The receiver
extracts the steganogram and sends the appropriate ac-
knowledgement.
• FR/R-based RSTEG: The sender marks the segment se-
lected for hidden communication by distributing the IS
across its payload. After successful segment delivery, the
receiver starts to issue duplicate ACKs to trigger retrans-
mission. When the ACK counter at the sender side ex-
ceeds specified value, the segment is retransmitted. Pay-
load of the retransmitted segment contains a steganogram.
The receiver extracts the steganogram and sends an ap-
propriate acknowledgement.
• SACK based RSTEG: The scenario is exactly the same
as FR/R, but in the case of SACK, it is possible that
many segments are retransmitted because of potential
non-contiguous data delivery.
3.2 RSTEG implementation
Experimental RSTEG implementation has been done on
Linux 2.6.27.7-9 kernel, which supports all mentioned re-
transmission mechanisms. It allows measuring stegano-
graphic bandwidth, retransmission difference and other
RSTEG parameters introduced in Sect. 3.3. RSTEG-related
important modifications to the TCP/IP stack are described
below.
3.2.1 Sending procedure modifications
The sending phase was modified to queue steganograms de-
livered by application layer and wait for cover data (which
also come from the application). When cover data comes
to Linux kernel, IS (Identifying Sequence) is inserted to
mark segment for retransmission. In this experimental ver-
sion predefined data at the end of the segment is used as
IS to recognize it easily in network traffic dumps. In non-
experimental version the IS should be distributed across seg-
ments` payload field.
The Linux TCP/IP stack has some data transfer and ker-
nel operations’ optimizations e.g. data collation, putting data
in many blocks in memory. These optimizations cannot be
used successfully along with RSTEG. The first one could
cause joining segments containing secret and cover data.
Joining only cover or secret data in one segment does not
affect steganographic transmission, but in this experiment
we turned off this mechanism to simplify procedure. The
second optimization mechanism is used with network cards
that support scatter-gather operations, in other cases all user
data is linearized by kernel. Changing data, which is split in
many memory blocks, requires complicated operations, that
is why linearization of user data was always used.
3.2.2 Receiving procedure modifications
Receiver’s task is to recognize segments containing IS.
The sequence is computed for each incoming segment and
compared with extracted one. If segment is recognized as
RSTEG retransmission request, then no ACK is sent, other-
wise data is acknowledged and delivered to an application.
If steganogram arrives and receiver detects lack of re-
transmission request for this segment then no ACK is sent
and recovery procedure is applied (see Sect. 3.1).
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Fig. 3 Experimental network topology
Among all kernel optimization mechanisms only adja-
cent segment collapsing is unable to work with RSTEG. Ad-
jacent segment collapsing joins data from many segments
into one block before delivering to application. RSTEG re-
quires delivering segments separately because steganograms
are recognized also in application layer.
3.2.3 Retransmission procedure modifications
Retransmission procedure is the most important phase of
steganographic communication. For each segment marked
for retransmission by RSTEG, retransmission counter is cre-
ated. If retransmission is triggered and counter is zero or
even then the payload is replaced by steganogram, otherwise
segment is retransmitted without change (recovery proce-
dure).
After data replacement it is necessary to update also the
checksum unless network card supports TCP Checksum Of-
fload, which processes checksum calculation on the network
card.
3.3 Experiment methodology
The network topology in Fig. 3 was designed to fit Internet
traffic retransmission statistics (see Sect. 3.1). The source
node (SRC) transmits TCP traffic and UDP background traf-
fic to destination node (DEST) through 1 Mb/s bottleneck,
which causes natural retransmissions.
Traffic parameters presented as below were matched to
achieve ∼3–4% of natural retransmissions with zero size
buffers on routers R1 and R2.
Simulation parameters (when network retransmission
probability (NRP ) equals 3%)
• TCP throughput: 125 kb/s
• UDP throughput: 1 160 kb/s
• Transmission time: 600 s
• Measured time: 540 s
• Measure start delay: 60 s
• Payload size: 1 200 B
Network traffic was measured for 9 minutes, starting after
1 minute from the beginning of transmission. The RSTEG
intentional retransmission probability (IRP ) was changed
from 0 to 5% with intermediary steps at 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%,
4% and 5%.
In the above simulation scenario, five parameters were
measured:
• Steganographic Bandwidth (SB )—the amount of the
steganogram transmitted using RSTEG during one sec-
ond [B/s]. Parameter may be expressed as
SB = NS · SS
T
[B/s]
where NS denotes the number of segments used for hid-
den communication, SS—the size of segment payload and
T —the duration of the connection. SB was measured by
receivers` application, which counted number of the suc-
cessfully received steganograms and their size.
• Retransmissions Difference (RD)—the difference be-
tween retransmissions in the network after applying
RSTEG and in the network before applying RSTEG.
This parameter can be used to estimate the influence that
RSTEG has on the TCP retransmissions rate. Thus, it il-
lustrates how to choose the correct intentional retransmis-
sion probability to limit the risk of detection.
RD was measured with Wireshark sniffer (www.
wireshark.org) in pcap traffic dumps by counting seg-
ments suspected to be retransmitted.
• Steganographic Retransmissions Ratio (SR)—the
amount of steganographic retransmissions in all retrans-
missions.
• TCP Throughput (TT )—the effective TCP throughput
measured on the DEST node.
• Effective IRP —IRP measured on the DEST node.
3.4 Traffic analysis of TCP-based RSTEG TCP
The results achieved in the experiment are presented in
Fig. 4 and Table 1. The results prove that bandwidth of the
steganographic channel is increasing together with inten-
tional retransmissions, while the increase of RD is slower
as shown in Fig. 4(a). In real world TCP/IP stack imple-
mentation the congestion avoidance algorithms are reducing
congestion window, which is natural response to retransmis-
sions. That effect causes throughput reduction and smaller
retransmissions difference than was intentionally triggered
in [1%; 2%] IRP range. When IRP reaches 3% its value is
around number of retransmissions for normal network con-
ditions (RSTEG-free) and RD is non-zero because of ran-
dom choice of segments marked for retransmission. Next,
the IRP reaches up to 5%, which causes more retransmis-
sions in the network again, but still fewer than number of
the intentional retransmissions because of congestion avoid-
ance algorithms.
Figure 4(b) shows that in network congestion state in-
tentional retransmissions are reducing the number of natu-
ral ones (but of course total number of retransmissions is
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Fig. 4 Traffic analysis of
TCP-based RSTEG
(a) Steganographic Bandwidth (SB ) and TCP Throughput (TT )
(b) Steganographic Retransmissions Ratio (S R) and Retransmissions Difference (RD)
Table 1 Summarized experimental results
IRP SB RD SR TCP throughput Effective IRP
[B/s] σ [%] σ [%] σ [kB/s] σ [%] σ
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.6 0.2 0 0
1% 252 18 0.46 0.23 24 2.9 25.1 0.2 1.01 0.08
2% 461 37 0.48 0.23 45 4.3 24.6 0.1 1.87 0.15
3% 665 37 0.22 0.18 69 3.4 24.2 0.2 2.74 0.16
4% 867 36 0.48 0.16 85 5.1 24.2 0.1 3.58 0.15
5% 1056 58 0.83 0.2 96 2.3 24.1 0.1 4.39 0.24
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still higher). The optimal intentional retransmissions level
is 5% when almost all retransmitted segments are used for
steganographic communication.
Keeping total retransmissions number on reasonable
level is necessary to avoid detection. The experimental re-
sults show that we can achieve decent steganographic band-
width while maintaining non-suspicious level of retransmis-
sions.
3.5 RSTEG detection
Retransmissions in IP networks are a “natural phenomenon”,
and so intentional retransmissions introduced by RSTEG are
not easy to detect if they are kept at a reasonable level. The
experimental results presented here show that RSTEG is a
very effective and hard to detect steganographic method.
Moreover, if the sender can observe the average retransmis-
sion rate in a network, then it can also choose an IRP so as
to limit the risk of detection.
One possible detection method is statistical steganaly-
sis based on the network retransmission rate. If for certain
TCP connections, the retransmission rate are significantly
higher than for others, then potential usage of RSTEG may
be detected. Such a steganalysis method involves monitor-
ing of the TCP retransmission rates for all connections in
a sub-network. If RSTEG is utilized in Internet and the to-
tal retransmissions level does not exceed estimated average
Internet retransmissions level (3–7% [6, 7]) there is only
small possibility to detect steganographic communication.
The results in Fig. 5 show that the total retransmissions level
fits this range, even if RSTEG intentional retransmissions
level reaches 5% which means almost 1 kB/s steganographic
bandwidth.
However, there is a solution that makes the steganaly-
sis of TCP-based RSTEG easier to perform. The proposed
steganalysis method may be implemented with a passive
warden [8] (or some other network node responsible for
steganographic communication detection). Passive warden
must be able to monitor all the TCP traffic and for each
TCP connection it must store sent segments for the given pe-
riod of time, which depends on the retransmission timer i.e.
passive warden must store the segment until it is acknowl-
edged by the receiver so the retransmission is not possible
any more. When there is a retransmission issued, passive
warden compares originally sent segment with retransmit-
ted one and if the payload significantly differs RSTEG is
detected and the segment is dropped. However, it should
be noted that this may cause serious performance issues if
passive warden monitors all the TCP connections and must
store a large number of the segments.
On the other hand, it must be noted that based on results
presented in [9] up to 0.09% (1 in 1100) of TCP segments
may be corrupted due to network delivery. As a result, an
imperfect copy of a segment may be sent to the receiver.
After reception of the invalid segment, verification is per-
formed based on the value in the TCP Checksum field, and
the need to retransmit is signalled to the sender. Thus, in
this scenario, the original segment and the retransmitted one
will differ from each other. Occurrences of this effect in
IP networks mask the use of RSTEG. Thus, the steganal-
ysis methods described above may fail, because the warden
will drop retransmitted segments when differences among
segments are discovered, and as a result, user data will be
lost.
It is worth noting that even for the low rates of intentional
retransmission (0.09%) that are required to mask RSTEG, if
we assume that the TCP segments are generated at a rate of
200 segments/s, with the connection lasting 5 minutes and
the segment’s payload size being 1000 bytes, then this re-
sults in SB = 180 Bps, which should be considered as high
steganographic bandwidth.
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To summarise, measures to detect RSTEG have been pro-
posed and can be utilised, but if the rate of intentional re-
transmissions is very low, the detection of hidden communi-
cations may be difficult.
4 Conclusions
RSTEG is an intra-protocol hybrid steganography method.
This paper described how RSTEG can be integrated into
Linux kernel. Experimental results obtained on real TCP/IP
stack traffic analysis were presented.
Achieved results proved that RSTEG is an effective
steganographic method which offers high steganographic
bandwidth when compared with other network steganog-
raphy methods. The steganographic bandwidth depends
mainly on RSTEG intentional retransmissions level (IRP )
which affects number of usually retransmitted segments dur-
ing connection. RSTEG causes less increase of total retrans-
missions level than IRP level which makes it harder to de-
tect. Keeping total retransmissions at reasonable level is cru-
cial for RSTEG otherwise it may be vulnerable to detection.
RSTEG steganalysis may be based on a passive war-
den which must be able to monitor all the TCP traffic. For
each TCP connection it must store segments sent until they
are acknowledged by the receiver so the retransmission is
not possible any more. When retransmission occurs, passive
warden compares originally sent segment with retransmit-
ted one and if there is a difference existence of RSTEG is
detected and the segment is dropped. However, such warden
behavior may lead to serious performance issues because of
need to monitor all the TCP connections and storing a large
number of the segments.
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